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Flattery and the History of  Political Thought: That Glib and Oily Art 
Daniel J. Kapust, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, v+230pp., ISBN: 9781107043367 
 
It is a piece of  conventional wisdom that the word ‘flatterer’ is an insult, not a term of 
endearment. The commonly used words ‘kiss-ass’, and ‘suck up’, silently uttered or expressed in a 
loud voice as a reaction to performances of  sycophancy, convey our despair of  flatterers and 
suggest this much. In political theory, Daniel Kapust reminds us in Flattery and the History of  
Political Thought: That Glib and Oily Art, flatterers have not fared much better. The prevalent view 
of  flattery, traced to the earliest philosophical treatments of  that phenomenon, denounces 
flattery as immoral tout court – a denunciation which is sustained by a juxtaposition between 
kolakeia (flattery) and the ideal of  parrhesia (frank speech) (Plato, 1987; Plutarch, 1949). The long-
standing denunciation of  flattery notwithstanding, that phenomenon was, at least, treated as an 
important moral and political problem. What is puzzling is that flattery, though ubiquitous in 
political life, has received little attention by political theorists today.   
 
This recognition animates Kapust’s captivating book, the aim of  which is to give flattery its due, 
and fill a lacuna in political thought. Via a meticulous enquiry into a range of  figures, periods, 
arguments and interpretations expertly drawn from novel readings of  classical works in political 
thought, works of  literature, tales and fables, Kapust offers a thought-provoking historical and 
theoretical treatment of  flattery, which grapples with its peculiar nature and its intricate 
relationship with other forms of  worrisome speech (hypocrisy, lying, and bullshit), fleshing out, 
with precision, its different facets and functions.  
 
For those self-assured proponents of  the negative or moralistic view of  flattery, Kapust’s book 
bears uncomfortable news. Or, so it would seem. The main thesis is that ‘we should not label 
flattery as morally and politically bad per se’ (p. 11). To acknowledge that point and presuppose 
that one has ascertained some important truth, will not, however, do. For, whilst we should not 
‘label flattery as a vice, tout court’ (p. 13), not all flattery is desirable. In short, Kapust does not 
reject the moralistic account of  flattery in toto; flattery might be problematic, especially when 
virtuosos of  flattery employ ‘insincere praise … [which] may harm those to whom it is applied’ 
or ‘manipulate them into doing what they would not otherwise do’ (p. 24). Kapust thus sets out 
to show that whilst most political thought scorns flattery ‘matters are much more complicated’ (p. 
25).  
 
What complicates matters is not just that flattery poses different challenges to different contexts 
– challenges which Kapust expertly brings to light – but rather the recognition that the question 
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of  whether flattery is reprehensible cannot be addressed in abstracto of  the messiness of  politics, 
and without addressing the prior questions of  ‘what [flattery] does, who is doing it, and why’ (p. 
26). Kapust’s integration of  an admirable command of  historical detail and philosophical analysis 
thus proceeds by approaching flattery via a non-ideal lens. His analysis runs counter to the 
aspirations of  ideal paradigms of  deliberative democracy which, be they Rawlsian or 
Habermasian, put forward a sanitised, apolitical vision of  communication sustained by a belief  in 
consensus. These paradigms highlight the unconditional value of  truthfulness and scorn the 
strategic employment of  discourse, i.e. the treatment of  one’s audience and interlocutors as 
objects to be manipulated or subdued. Echoing the mantra of  the recent realist turn in political 
theory, Kapust’s analysis endeavours to be attentive to the grubbiness of  politics: ‘political life’, 
he emphasises, ‘is about friction’ (p. 202). As such, ‘our institutions and the “social facts” in 
which they – and we are – embedded … remind us, when encountering the place of  flattery in 
the history of  political thought, of  the importance of  the non-ideal’ – the permanence of  
‘dependence, inequality, and hierarchy’ (pp. 202-3).  
 
Adopting a non-ideal perspective, Kapust distinguishes between cunning flatterers – the object of  
moralist scorn – and dependent flatterers whose flattery is not fuelled by avarice, but by ‘the 
precariousness of  their social status’ (p. 4). The latter, Kapust maintains, are less bothersome 
than the former as ‘overt deference’ might form ‘a protective barrier that surrounds dominated 
persons’ (p. 8). Taking his cue from James Scott’s (1985; 1990) distinction between public 
transcripts – the public performances of  the weak which create the superficial impression of  
wilful submission to the powerful – and hidden transcripts – off-stage critiques of  power – 
Kapust suggests that flattery can function as a weapon of  the weak, a coping strategy in 
conditions of  subordination.  
 
The discussion unfolds in five core chapters which interrogate flattery via the establishment of  
dialogue between conceptually and linguistically overlapping works in the history of  political 
thought. Chapter 1 explores the connection between flattery, equality, and legitimacy via a 
comparative study of  Cicero and Pliny. By treating Cicero’s and Pliny’s speeches as public 
transcripts, Kapust illustrates how Roman Republican anxieties ‘about status and power 
inequalities’ connection to flattery and tyranny’ and the corrosive effects of  such inequalities on 
friendship and frank speech formed the ideological foundation for the princeps’ legitimacy – an 
idealised account of  the relationship between rulers and ruled which legitimised otherwise 
intolerable inequalities ‘by the presence of  friendship and the absence of  flattery’ (p. 61). Chapter 
2 considers the relationship between flattery and modes of  discourse, especially courtly style. To 
that end, Kapust turns to Machiavelli and Castiglione who seek to ‘understand and prevent the 
3 
harms of  flattery, harms that were quite likely to redound princes’ and who articulate contrasting 
accounts of  the virtuous advisor (p. 200). Castiglione’s ideal courtier ‘captivates to instruct’: he 
utilises pleasing ornament which enables him to manipulate the prince into accepting his harsh, 
albeit necessary, teachings, and into doing what he should have done. Machiavelli, in contrast, 
‘instructs to captivate’: he rejects ornament and utilises an unflattering style, captivating his 
audience via an open display of  his learning (p. 65).  
 
The discussion then turns to the connection between flattery and types of  political authority. By 
engaging imaginatively with Hobbes’s thought, Kapust illustrates that Hobbes’s defence of  
monarchy rests on his scepticism about participatory governments and an appreciation of  the 
political dangers of  flattery. Monarchy is less susceptible to flattery because it is contingently 
unitary: the unity of  the natural and the artificial person of  the sovereign representative 
constitutes a bulwark against ‘rhetorical appeals’, sparked by ‘desire to win for private gain’, which 
typify plural sovereigns (p. 118). Chapter 4 explores flattery qua element of  theories of  language 
and identity formation via a comparative reading of  Mandeville and Smith. At the core of  
Mandeville’s instrumentalist suggestion that flattery constitutes an agent of  socialisation, Kapust 
argues, lies a bleak account of  human nature and sociability: flattery is ‘an outgrowth of  
language’ which is ‘manipulative’ and which is rooted in 'our desire to control others and confirm 
our own sense of  worth’ (p. 168). Smith proceeds in the opposite way: flattery is a manifestation 
of  our natural sociability – our capacity for sympathy, love of  praiseworthiness, and endeavour to 
establish relationships of  mutual agreement, not of  domination. Chapter 5 centres on 
accusations of  flattery as a political tactic, with a focus on the ratification debates. What animated 
that rhetorical battle, Kapust argues, was not merely the endeavour to denigrate one’s opponents 
as obsequious, but rather two contrasting visions of  what America was, and what it would (or 
could) be. For, the Federalists denounced the Anti-Federalist commitment to local bonds and 
liberties as ‘flattery of  prejudice’ – the pandering to local prejudices which would engender 
fragmentation and frailty (p. 179). The Anti-Federalists, in turn, accused the Federalists for 
promising a romantic future of  greatness, empire, and unity which would eradicate liberty and 
difference.  
 
Whilst Kapust cruises effortlessly through the history of  political thought, a less flattering 
reviewer would, perhaps, ask for more. For instance, the suggestion that Smith’s theory stems 
from within politics is underdeveloped, perhaps unwarranted given its hypothetical foundations. 
More importantly, the core promise of  the book – the endeavour to challenge the moralistic view 
– does not fully materialise. This is not just because Kapust remains immersed in historical 
articulations of  the moralistic account – as he acknowledges ‘whether it was Cicero, Pliny, 
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Castiglione, Machiavelli, or Hobbes, flattery was a bad thing’, either morally and/or politically, 
and only Mandeville, from the authors surveyed, ‘seems to view flattery as a good thing’ (p. 138). 
Rather, the trouble is that whilst Kapust shows that flattery can be a tactic used by the less powerful, 
he does not convincingly illustrate how it can be a weapon of  the weak. For, Cicero’s and Pliny’s 
ideal rulers and ruled, Castiglione’s ideal courtier, and Smith’s and Mandeville’s commercial agents 
operate amid conditions of  dependence and/or inequality, not of  servitude. Kapusts’s agents are 
political somebodies – they hold some political power, regardless of  how small that slice of  
power might be – and employ flattery to advance the public good; they are not political nobodies – 
persecuted or excluded – employing flattery to challenge power and disrupt radical injustice. The 
aforementioned problem is magnified by the all-male and all-white line-up, and the 
corresponding omission of  the perspectives and experiences of  historically excluded and 
marginalised groups – slave and women narratives, and black and feminist political thought.  
 
These issues aside, this is an impressively rich book which will be of  interest to scholars 
concerned with problems of  flattery, and those immersed in the history of  political thought and 
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